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A commentary on
Reporting dream experience: why (not) to
be skeptical about dream reports
by Windt, J. M. (2013). Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:708. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.
2013.00708
Windt (2013) eloquently and compellingly
presents an anti-skeptical approach to the
use of subjective dream reports in empiri-
cal research (the “transparency view”). On
this view, dream reports are “trustworthy
sources of evidence about the occurrence
and phenomenal character of experience
during sleep, at least when gathered under
ideal reporting conditions.” Her paper is
an example of the changing tides in the
cognitive neuroscience of consciousness,
and is a welcome valorization of the util-
ity of subjective reports. The long-standing
distrust of verbal reports of private mental
processes is gradually giving way to real-
ization of the necessity for incorporating
first-person reports into objective, third-
person paradigms in mutually informing
ways (Varela and Shear, 1999)—amethod-
ology often embraced by the term “neu-
rophenomenology” (Lutz and Thompson,
2003). But what are “ideal reporting con-
ditions?” Taking Windt’s “transparency
view” as a starting point, we discuss a
number of methodological considerations
for neurophenomenological research on
dreaming.
We agree with Windt that it is crucial
for empirical dream research to establish
the extent to which dream reports are
“transparent” accounts of subjective expe-
riences; indeed, such transparency is the
sine qua non for conducting meaning-
ful qualitative and quantitative research
on dream content. However, whereas
dream experiences may be disclosed to
the dreamer—or at least appear in the
dreamer’s memory—in a transparent way,
important individual differences exist
in introspective skills and in ability to
articulate the breadth or depth of experi-
ence accurately in verbal or written form
(Fleming et al., 2010; Sze et al., 2010; Fox
et al., 2012). We may need to ask then, on
both practical and epistemological levels,
whether we wish to uncover what is “typ-
ical” in dreams of a certain socio-cultural
population (the “breadth” of dreaming),
or what is “possible” in the dream state
(the “depth” of dreaming). In light of
this distinction, the “ideal conditions”
for reporting dreams may well be differ-
ent depending on whether the purpose
of a study is to assess breadth or depth
of dream experience. Accordingly, and to
further integrate dream studies within
the nascent neurophenomenological
framework, we outline two methodolog-
ical elements that support more reliable
elicitation, collection and analysis of
dream reports: (1) specific and rigorous
laboratory conditions for dream collec-
tion; and (2) introspective training and/or
solicitation of “expert” participants.
SPECIFIC LABORATORY CONDITIONS
Laboratory-based dream research has
been based, from its early beginnings
(e.g., Dement and Kleitman, 1957), on
an approach that combines physiological
measurement (EEG and other mark-
ers) with subjective dream reports. This
has revealed qualitative and quantitative
differences in the nature of dream expe-
riences reported after awakenings from
REM sleep, NREM sleep (McNamara
et al., 2010), and NREM Stage 1 sleep
onset (Nielsen et al., 2005; Stenstrom et al.,
2012): REM sleep has been found to pos-
sess the most vivid and immersive dreams,
NREM sleep the most thought-like men-
tation, and Stage1 NREM sleep the
briefest but nonetheless REM-like men-
tation (Dement and Kleitman, 1957). One
major limitation of the laboratory-based
study, however, is the “first-night effect,”
known to change sleep architecture—
especially that of REM sleep—(Agnew
et al., 1966) and increase the incorpo-
ration of laboratory-related content into
dreams (Schredl, 2008).
Although there exist home-based
sleep monitoring devices, such as the
“Nightcap” (Ajilore et al., 1995), which
might appear to sidestep these issues,
such tools do not yet rival the variety or
precision of lab-based polysomnography.
Lab-based studies allow for precise elec-
trode placement as well as for additional
physiological measures, such as heart rate,
respiration, muscle tone, eye movements
and others, allowing much more than a
simple demarcation of sleep stages. Such
additional information has been profitably
correlated with, and investigated along-
side, sleep EEG and subjective reports (cf.
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Fox et al., 2013). Additionally, lab-based
studies allow examination of physiological
signatures of particular interest, and col-
lection of reports in the closest possible
temporal proximity to both physiological
markers and dreamed experiences.
“EXPERT” PARTICIPANTS AND
INTROSPECTIVE TRAINING
Different “expert” groups are used with
several neurophenomenological appro-
aches, including studies of dreaming.
One such target group consists of profi-
cient lucid dreamers who, being able to
maintain awareness of their dream states,
are asked to describe specific aspects of
their dream experience (Fenwick et al.,
1984; Lequerica, 1996; Dresler et al.,
2011). Other expert groups who have
been studied to access particular features
of dream formation include gymnasts
for their sensitivity to vestibular expe-
rience (Sauvageau et al., 1998), and
vivid/frequent dreamers for their ability
to access mentation reliably and with little
forgetting (Stenstrom et al., 2012), among
others. Introspective training for dream
reporting has not been widely used in
dream studies, but there is growing inter-
est in developing such strategies (Smith,
1986; Solomonova et al., 2008). There is
also evidence that expert meditation prac-
titioners provide more accurate, objective
introspective reports than non-meditators
(Sze et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2012), and
many meditators embrace traditions that
practice observation of the dream state
similar to lucid dreaming (e.g., Gillespie,
1988; Wangyal, 1998). Training partici-
pants in dream reporting, and in more
generalized methods of attuning attention
to one’s ownmental states, such as medita-
tion (MacLean et al., 2010), may facilitate
more accurate and detailed reports of
dream activity (Lutz and Thompson,
2003). Although highly-trained introspec-
tors may not reflect the full “breadth” of
dream experiences for a given population,
they may prove instrumental in probing
the “depth” of possible mental activity in
sleep (cf. Dresler et al., 2011, 2012).
We agree with Windt that trusting the
dreamer to give transparent reports is a
prerequisite for detailed study of subjec-
tive experiences during sleep. But a fur-
ther step in reliably assessing the breadth
and depth of dreaming is to ensure the
greatest possible methodological support
for such reporting. Providing the “ideal”
reporting conditions of the sleep labo-
ratory in conjunction with introspective
training and the selection of expert par-
ticipants are two particularly promising
methods. Applying appropriate combina-
tions of physiological measurements and
finely tuned phenomenological interviews
may yet illuminate some of the stubbornly
opaque features of oneiric production, and
further clarify the intricate web of rela-
tionships that bonds sleep physiology and
dream phenomenology.
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